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INTRODUCTION
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Trial Court's award of
alimony, imputing wages (without using historical income), division of
equity in marital assets and computing military retirement correctly was
clearly erroneous and supported by adequate findings.
Judy's attorney took an approach in court to discredit Larry on two issues
in which Larry admitted in court before trial began, that he misrepresented.
The two issues were the sale of two vehicles in Larry's possession and the
sale of the Laundromat.

Both the vehicles and the Laundromat were

awarded to Larry. But yet council wants to use this as the primary issue
again, as a basis for those in authority to base their decisions. Utah case law
teaches that "correctness means the appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
law." State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court
abuses its discretion if its decision is beyond the limits of reasonableness.
State v. Olsen. 860P. 2d, 332-334 (Utah 1993).
The undisputed evidence established that Larry, the husband and
appellant, did not have the ability to pay the alimony or child support given
his income and expenses. Conversely, Judy failed to prove that she lacked
the ability to pay her own reasonable expenses or the trial court need not
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provide subsidiary findings on Larry's ability to pay alimony. This Court
however has stressed the importance of subsidiary findings on both parties'
ability to provide their own needs. See Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 557,
& note 1, (Ut. Ct. App 1993) ('[I]n short, the payor spouse's reasonable
needs are a necessary subsidiary step in determining the ability to provide
support.')
Judy has stated in her brief that Larry was underemployed and voluntarily
unemployed, even though evidence (Tp. 634,637) was shown that the
company he had worked for six years prior terminated him because the INF
Treaty Contract with the Russians was not renewed (Tp 634). Larry also
proved that he did try to obtain employment by a stack of applications
submitted while he was unemployed. (Tp 557, Exhibit 9). Larry's counsel
did not accept the stipulation of Judy's income of $7.50. and did offer
evidence through Judy's own testimony, that she did make more money
through other employment that she had worked prior to managing the
Homestyle Laundromat business. (Tp 301-302).
It is difficult

to follow Appellee's brief titled

"EVIDENCE

SUPPORTING THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY", when it is not
clear whom counsel is referring to Judy? or Larry? Did "Mrs. Cox suggest
the trial court erred?" Or was it Mr. Cox? Did "Mrs. Cox fail to describe
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how this happened?" Or was it Mr. Cox? It is very difficult to respond to
this Brief when it is unclear of who said what? The fact of this matter is that
there was no actual findings submitted by Judy that a loan was made against
the equity of the Sego Lily home after separation of the two parties, as
indicated in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Judy did not title
it equity, but titled it Net Loan Proceeds (Para. 126). "In a divorce action
there is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of debts.
However, such allocation must be based upon actual findings which ruling
we will not disturb absent in abuse of discretion." Rhen v. Rhen, 1999 t/tah
App. 41, P 19, 974, P.2d 306 (citations omitted).
Judy does not want the 10 months 14 days included in the Woodward
formula, because she would get approximately $100 less a month than what
she is getting. Larry does not want to cheat Judy out of her legal portion of
the retirement. He, however, does want the dates to be correct of when he
entered the military and what portion of that military time Judy was married
to him.
For these reasons and as discussed more fully below, the Trial Court's
alimony award, imputed wages, division of property, and military retirement
should be reversed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

LARRY'S INABILITY TO PAY ALIMONY MAKES THE
ALIMONY AWARD CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
A. The Undisputed Evidence Established Larry's Inability To
Pay Alimony In The Amount Of $900/Month.

In awarding alimony, the trial court must determine whether the obligor
spouse has the ability, given his income and expenses, to provide support.
Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 550-51 &ft.l.

"Failure to consider [this factor]

in fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. In
the instant case, the trial court failed to properly consider Larry's ability to
pay given his income and expenses. Wiley, supra, 866 P.2d at 550-51 (A
factual determination on payor spouse's financial need "is required for an
assessment of the third Jones factor, the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support.") Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993)
("[T]he findings should also address [payor's] needs and expenditures, such
as housing, payment of debts, and other living expenses.") This evidence
consisted of unemployment checks and military retirement benefits at trial
which was (Tp 555):
Date
7/1/2001 to 10/1/2001
TOTAL:

Gross
$l,173.00(unemployment)
3,293.00 (retirement)
$4,466.00
4

Net
$1,173.00
970.00
$2,143.00

(The Military retirement was $3,293.00, after taxes $2,470.00, and after
Judy took her half of $1,500.00, Larry had a net of $970.00.)

The Trial

Court never did consider Larry's ability to pay at the time of court, but what
he could make. Money that Larry has never recognized!
For the purpose of assessing his ability to pay alimony, Larry's opening
brief before this Court used the net income amount of $2,800.00 and
$2,850.00. See Appellant's Opening Brief at p.20.
Larry also submitted the only evidence concerning his expenses. His
monthly expenses was listed at $3,276.23 (Tp 405, Exhibit 64) and may be
summarized as follows:
Expenses

Amount

Mortgage
$1,631.23
Food
400.00
Utilities
170.00
Phone
50.00
Clothing
100.00
Medical
35.00
Dental
35.00
Entertainment
100.00
Installment Payments
400.00
Water
75.00
Incidentals
50.00
Insurance
100.00
Maintenance
125.00
Total : $3,276.23
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Using this undisputed income and expenses, the Trial Court could not
have found that Larry had the ability to pay $900/month in alimony. His
total monthly expenses not including child support or alimony, are
$3,276.23 permonth. [Tp. 149 Ex. 58 ]. When child support of $469 and
alimony of $900 is added to this amount, his total expenses are $4,645.23
per month. Given that Larry's monthly net income after taxes is, to include
the military retirement, $2,800 and $2,850 per month. Larry does not have
sufficient funds to pay his legitimate expenses and child support, much less
an additional $900 a month for alimony. In fact his monthly deficit after
alimony is between $1,845.00 and $1,900.00 a month.
Judy called a Vocational Specialist, Dr. Famsworth, to provide her
opinion, based on Larry's resume, what he should be making.

Dr.

Famsworth stated that Larry should be making upwards of $90,000, an
income that Larry has never made. After trial Larry went to Dr. Famsworth
to seek this type of employment. Dr. Famsworth, after charging $450 to
rewrite his resume, gave him companies as well as web sites to submit his
resume. Dr. Famsworth even suggested that Larry consider driving trucks in
order to make this kind of income. After several months of unemployment
and the future looking bleak, Larry decided to apply to the Corrections
Academy, where there would be no discriminating against age. Larry passed

the physical and the academic requirements to enroll in the Corrections
Officer Academy, no small feat for a 58 year old. Larry was hired by the
State in the Utah Department of Corrections working in the prison on
January 14, 2002. Larry makes $11.41 per hour or $21,907.00 per year,
which is $22,000 a year less than what Larry was imputed.
Judy again tries to confuse the facts by stating that Larry was awarded the
Laundromat and that it is a revenue producing asset. Although Judy makes
these claims in her brief, she never supported this claim by reference to the
record.

Judy knows that the Laundromat was sold in April, 2001,

approximately five months prior to trial and that the contract has since been
turned over to a third party for relief of debts. Larry has not recognized any
revenue from the sell of the Laundromat since trial.
B.

Judy Has Not Cited This Court To Any Evidence Tending
To Show Larry Had The Ability To Pay The Alimony
Awarded.

Before this Court, Judy's argument on Larry's ability to pay border on
the frivolous and must be rejected.

She bases her arguments on factual

allegations that are unsupported by the record or on legal assertions that are
contrary to Utah law. Judy stated in her brief that Dr. Farnsworth opinion
found that Mr. Cox could earn $90,000.00 per year and that Larry was
underemployed over the past six years after retiring from the military at
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$10.43 per hour.55 The ability to pay alimony is based on an opinion of what
Larry could by making but has never made since retiring from the military
six years prior. If Larry was voluntarily underemployed, why was it for six
years after retiring from the military?

This is a good example of why

historical history is used to determine of what income should be imputed for
the sake of alimony and child support. At the time of trial Larry's only
income was unemployment benefits which was approximately $1,173.00 per
month (Tp555). Judy mentions in her brief that Larry was receiving his
military retirement as income, but again failed to mention that she was
receiving half of this income also. Judy also states that together with the
military retirement and the unemployment benefits is evidence that showed
Larry's ability to pay. At the time of trial Larry was earning monthly
$970.00 in military retirement and $1,173.00 in unemployment benefits.
This equals $2,143.00 a month. After $900.00 for alimony and $469.00 for
child support is taken from that income, Larry has $774.00 to live with.
Larry's expenses were listed at $3,276.23 per month. Judy on the other hand
had income wages ($1,200.00), Military Retirement ($1,537.05), Alimony
($900.00), Child Support ($469.00), and Mother's rent ($600.00).

This

totals $4,706.00 per month. Judy's income is $3,932.00 per month greater
then Larry's total monthly income. Today Larry is employed with the State
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of Utah, as a corrections officer making $11.41 per hour or $1,825.00 per
month (Exhibit A) Along with Larry's military retirement of $1,569.00
(Exhibit B), he earns approximately $3,394.00. After alimony and child
support Larry's gross spending power is $2,025.00, which is still $1,400
below Judy's spending power and $2014.00 below his living expenses.
To create the illusion that Larry has the ability to pay, Judy argues that
Larry's gross income of $2,500.00 per month or what he could be making
justifies a finding that Larry has the ability to pay. Judy however cites no
case law for the proposition that gross income justifies an alimony award.
This absence of legal support is not surprising given this Court's
requirements that the trial court determine the payor spouse's net income in
determining a payor spouse's ability to pay. Baker, supra, 866p.2dat 547.
C. The Willey Case Does Not Justify The Trial Court
Ignoring The Uncontroverted Evidence of Larry's Income
and Expenses.
Relying on Willey, the wife sought to establish a need for $660/month in
medical expenses based on a one-time, non-recurring operation. The trial
court rejected this expense because the evidence showed it was nonrecurring and the wife had not provided otherwise. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the Trial Court ruling and held:
At trial, she had the burden of proving her monthly need
for that amount. The trial court, however, expressly found that there
9

was no evidence to support such a need on a monthly basis and that the
amount claimed was unreasonable.
Willeyv. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 231 (Utah 1997).
Willey does not support Judy's claim to alimony and shows the weakness
of the Trial Court's findings in the instant case. In contrast to the trial court
in Willey, the Trial Court in the instant case made no express findings
concerning Larry's expenses and stated no reason why it should not accept
those expenses. In fact, Judy in her testimony to this Court does not cite to
anything in the record suggesting that Larry's expenses are unreasonable.
Willey thus provides no basis for this Court or the Trial Court ignoring
uncontroverted evidence of Larry's income and expenses.
D. Judy Has Failed To Satisfy Her Burden of Proving Her
Inability To Provide For Her Own Reasonable Needs.
The evidence does not show that Judy's income is insufficient to satisfy
her reasonable expenses. Even if Larry had the ability to pay child support,
which he does not, Judy would not be entitled to an award of alimony unless
she established her own inability to provide for her reasonable needs.
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P2.d 1065, 1068 (Ut Ct App. 1994) (The
recipient spouse's need for payment to cover her expenses constitutes "the
maximum permissible alimony award" regardless of payor spouse's ability
to pay.) Such proof would require evidence not only of her ability to earn
income, but also of her reasonable expenses.
10

As this Court held in Willey, Judy's proof of her own reasonable
expenses and income is critically important to the Trial Court's balancing of
the parties' competing needs. There, this Court held:
We have previously reversed an alimony award in a similar case
when the trial court failed to address the parties5 financial needs. In
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), because the parties
4
dissipated and lived on credit/ the trial court did not give 'much
weight....as to what the needs and abilities of the parties might be.5 Id.
at 492. Thus, the trial court failed to determine the reasonableness of
the expenses each party claimed. This court reasoned that 'without a
finding on reasonable expenses, we are unable to determine the true
needs of Wife, or to determine Husband's actual ability to pay and,
therefore, to balance Wife's needs against Husband's ability to pay as
required in Jones.5 Id. at 493.Willey, supra, 866 P. 2d at 551 (emphasis
supplied).

As discussed below, Judy as failed to establish her financial need and this
court must reverse the alimony award. See Willey, supra, 951 P.2d at 231
(Party seeking alimony has burden of proving reasonableness of her
expenses).
1. Judy has the ability to work and earn income.
In analyzing Judy's ability to provide for her own needs, the first
consideration is her income-making ability. Judy owned and managed a
Laundromat for approximately two years and also worked in cleaning homes
at $10.00 per hour (Tp 570). Judy voluntarily quit the house cleaning job,
and instead worked for a friend at the Chocolate Covered Wagon at the
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minimum wage, as she so stated (Tp 258). She felt she should not work a 40
hour week, because she needed to be at home with her 15 year old child.
The child was in school most of the day. Judy did not want to work, she just
wanted to live off of Larry and his laborers. The Trial Court found that
since she was working at the Chocolate Covered Wagon for a friend at
minimum wage that is what she should be imputed, completely ignoring her
work history over the past six years that her and Larry were separated? No
Income Taxes or W-2's were used to determine imputed wages for Judy, just
three weeks of pay stubs (Tp 267). This is clearly abuse of discretion by the
Trial Court in determining what Judy's earning ability should have been.
2. Judy did not submit evidence on her living expenses,
Judy did not address this issue in her brief, because she has not and cannot
cite to anything in the record itemizing the amount or type of her living
expenses. Judy seeks to avoid this lack of proof because she believes she
has no burden to prove reasonable expenses. Both the Utah Supreme Court
and this Court have made clear that such proof is required to establish an
entitlement to alimony. Willey. Supra. 951 P.2d at 23L Willey, supra, 866
P. 2d at 550-51. Since no such proof exists here, the alimony award must be
reversed.
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E. AN ALIMONY AWARD MUST BE SUPPORTED BY
SUFFIECIENT FACTUAL FINDINGS SHOWING THAT
THE AWARD IS RATIONALLY BASED UPON
APPROPRITATE FACTORS.
The Trial Court's factual findings do not show the steps or rationale by
which trial court arrived at the conclusions to award alimony. A trial court's
findings supporting an alimony award must include findings on all material
issues. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). This
Court will reverse findings that fail to provide sufficient subsidiary findings
"to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue
was reached." Id. "[T]he trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings
on each factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's
discretionary determination was rationally based upon 'the three Jones
factors."

Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 951.

Findings on alimony are

insufficient if they: do not specifically set for [the recipient's] financial
condition and need for support, including her earning capacity, or [the
payor's] income and ability to pay." Stevens, supra, 754 P.2d at 958.
In the instant case, the Trial Court's findings with respect to alimony do
not provide sufficient subsidiary findings to permit this Court to determine
the steps by which the Trial Court reached its conclusion on alimony nor do
the findings show the alimony award was rationally based on the appropriate
factors. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992).
13

These findings do not address in any meaningful fashion either parties'
income or expenses. They provide no explanation of how the Trial Court
determined that Larry had the ability to pay or that Judy could not provide
her own reasonable needs or how the Trial Court balanced these competing
findings. See Willey, supra, 866 P.2d at 961. ("[W]ithout a finding on
reasonable expenses, we are unable to determine the true needs of Wife, or
to determine Husband's actual ability to pay and, therefore, to balance
Wife's needs against Husband's actual ability to pay as required in Jones."),
Chambers v. Chambers 840 P. 2d 841, 843 (Ut. Ct App. 1992). (Findings
that do no more than simply state that, "the defendant has the ability to pay"
are not sufficient).

It is thus impossible to divine how the Trial Court

arrived at its alimony award in this case.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPUTING WAGES
WITHOUT USING HISTORICAL
FINANCIAL
INFORMATION

Judy uses her demand that there was voluntary unemployed on the part of
Larry? Larry worked for Lewis Bros. Stages from May 1993 to July 2001,
approximately eight years without ever having a break between employment
(Tp 634). Larry was terminated from employment in July 2001, because the
INF treaty was never renewed between the Soviet Union and the United
States (Tp 635). At no time did Larry ever volunteer to be unemployed and
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was always seeking better employment. Like all other military veterans
seeking employment, the age factor becomes a problem and the fear of
retirement even a bigger problem.
This trial court determined that Larry was voluntarily unemployed, even
though evidence has proven that Larry was terminated because the contract
was not renewed (Tp 634). This is not a case where the Respondent quit his
job and did not want to find another job. Larry has worked from the day he
was retired from the military on January 26, 1993 and was only unemployed
for approximately six months during that eight year period. Presently Larry
works for the State of Utah, Utah Department of Corrections, as a Correction
Officer for $11.41 per hour. He cannot pay $900.00 per month for alimony!
III.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS' DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO DIVIDE THE VALUATION OF
PROPERTY EQUALLY.

The Appellee's brief states that the equity was divided equally by the
spreadsheet, that Judy composed, showing the allocation of equity and debt
between the parties (Pg. 9). Larry has stated "that the trial court's division
of property assets, in which Judy received 100% of the total equity in both
the Sego Lily home and the Riverton home in the form of a Net Loan
Proceeds, (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Pg. 20) was an abuse
of discretion." The Net Loan Proceeds, which Judy's attorney so cleverly
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disguised as a credit, by adding that credit to Larry's total and calling it
equity. In reality this is the amount ($54,704.00) that Judy claimed she
borrowed against the Sego Lily home after the parties separated (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Pg. 15). The Loan papers against the Sego
Lily home (Exhibit C) shows that the loan was taken in July 1995, the
parties separated in October 1995. This amount was not divided as marital
property, but as a loan credit that essentially eliminates the equity in the
Riverton home that the spreadsheet shows as equity to Larry. Then Judy's
attorney, dishonestly, confused a second loan taken with the Sego Lily home
in 1997 (Exhibit D) that was taken after the parties' separated. July's
attorney stated "in connection with the refinancing of the Sego Lily
residence the Petitioner obtained the sum of $10,514.00 which she used to
pay bills." {Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Pg. 16, Para. 98). This
particular refinancing occurred in 1997 (Exhibit D). There were two
different refinances done on the Sego Lily home, one in 1995 while the
parties were still living together and one in 1997 when the parties were
separated. (Exhibit C and Exhibit D). Petitioner confused the issue in
making the trial court believe that the loan credit was an equity loan
completed in 1997 after the parties' separated. This is not true and Exhibit C
clearly shows the equity loan was done in July of 1995, with Judy putting
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$25,000 in her personal account. The trial court erred by not using the loan
documents as evidence, but taking Judy's word as the only evidence in
making its' decision.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT
TO MILITARY RETIREMENT ARE ERRONEOUS.

Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Pg 3. Para. 13 states:
"Respondent's form DD-214 shows he entered the Army on December 10,
1968 as an officer, but entered the Army on January 26,1968 and retired,
as a Lieutenant Colonel, on January 31, 1993. From January 26, 1968 to
January 31, 1993 is exactly 9,130 days of active duty time. This is the
total time that Larry is being paid retirement on. Judy married Larry on
November 18, 1971 (Tp. 387, 388, Ex. 63). Larry retired from the military
on January 31, 1993. From November 18, 1971 to January 31, 1993 is
exactly 7,741 married military days. 7,741 (Married Military Days) divided
by 9,130 (Total Military Days) is exactly 84.78%. (Tp. 390). Judy is entitled
to half of the 84.78% of the military time that she was married to Larry or
42.39% of the retirement pay. "The appellate court can properly find abuse
only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court".
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885.887 (Utah 1978).
CONCLUSION
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Judy stated in her brief that Larry and her went to mediation and tried to
work things out and finally resolve these problems. At mediation Judy's
attorney stated that he was offended that my attorney did not show up. I
came to terms with Judy at this meeting and agreed to the terms. But again
what Judy's attorney fails to recognize is not what was agreed upon, but
what he added to the divorce decree that was never talked about during the
mediation that ruled in Judy's favor.

Larry refused to honor such an

agreement, because Judy's attorney did not honor their agreement by adding
things to the divorce decree that were never discussed during mediation at
that time. Mr. Wilde does not want to have this case resolved, because it
would prevent him from lining his pockets with innocent people's life
savings.
Larry only wants equality and fairness in the legal decision making
process so both parties can live their lives without any undue hardship. How
can there be equality when Larry is left owing $90,000 in judgments and
$900.00 a month in alimony and $469.00 a month in child support or
$1,369.00 a month from employment wages that he only earns $11.41 per
hour and nets approximately $1,367.80. He is virtually working for nothing.
The above facts of this case clearly manifest injustice or inequity to Larry as
to constitute a clear abuse of discretion. For these reasons and as set forth in
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appellant's Opening Brief, this Court should reverse the award of alimony,
recognize that Net Loan Proceeds was actually marital property, reverse the
imputed wages because no historical income was used, and properly
compute the military retirement so both Larry and Judy are treated equally.

Dated this

(f *

day of January, 2003,

LTC (R)
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FEDERAL TAX
FICA/MED
UTAH TAX
PEHP ADDL LIFE
PEHP BASC LIFE
BOSTON ML AD&D
PEHP CHLD LIFE
BOSTON ML IDEM
*MEDICAL INSUR
UPEA ASSN

14J943L27

,82152
! 20120

CURRENT

DEDUCTIONS

660100

DOLLARS

HOURS

^AR EARNING
?ORM ALLOW
4TIVE AWRD
LEAVE PAY
LEAVE PAY
)AY PAID
PAY DOWN
PAY DOWN

NET PAY

18I977I84

1186128
,100>00
1456140
'273'84
1723|12
1

4564
! 9ll28

5^1^191
|****,660'00

AMOUNT
OF WARRANT

I
I
I

YEAR TO DATE

2|0 75J23
1,577,10
110051061
'7 24-09
12 09l66|
11270
1 131201
1 30;90
, 52,47
;no;72|
i

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

TAX SUMMARY

MAIN CHECKING
\s
300
440

NON TAX PAY
I

PRE TAX DED.

4|666!09
I
I

NET TAXABLE

477
52,47

!9_Q8&2
20615651
DENOTES EARNINGS/DEDUCTIONS NOT SUBJECT TO TAXES
W-4 STATUS: S-01
ADDTL W/HOLD FED;
2Q2&
18628

IE BALANCES:
\NNUAL LEAVE
5ICK LEAVE
INVERTED SICK
:OMP TIME
XCESS HOURS
ADVANCES:

BEQ BALANCE

86,001
46'OOi

EARNED

1 USED/PAYOUT 1

'

41001
4100

'

191001
24iQ0l
BEQ.
BAL-

.00 ST:
CUR BALANCE

901001
50'OQI
191001
24,00

-

DED:

$10.52(STEP 031) TO $18.59(STEP 052) CORRL OFFICER
[T: $11.41 (STEP 034)
LONGEVITY STEP 0

CUR.
BAL'

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

.00

EXHIBIT B

I'll

I I R I'll"

«^WUUT STATEMENT
MENT EFFECTIVE DATE

NEW PAY DUE AS OF

APR 0 1 , 2002

SSN

529 58 3229

MAY 0 1 , 2002 <

;ftFA5~<Sl PfttNTS 6F
;E REMEMBER TO NOTIFY DFAS IF YOUR ADDRESS CHANGES

tCmtktT

DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
CLEVELAND CENTER (CODE PRR)
PO BOX 99191
CLEVELAND OH 44199-1126
COMMERCIAL (216) 522-5955
TOLL FREE 1-800-321-1080
TOLL FREE FAX 1-800-469-6559

LTC LARRY V COX USA
RET
2195 WEST 13250 SOUTH
RIVERTON UT
84065-6229

TEM

DESCRIPTION
OLD

PAY
IVER
.E INCOME

3,603.00
103-00
3,500.001

EMPLOYEE MEMBER SELF SERVICE (E/MSS)
https //emss dfas mil/emss htm
1-877-DOD-EMSS (1-877-363-3677)

Km.mm
NEW
3,603-00
103.00

1,962.95

ITEM

BE

FITW
SITW
ALLOTMENTS/BONDS
FORMER SPOUSE DED

NET PAY

YEAR

nriADpft£gg~^

TO

DATE

NEW

OLD

SUMMARY

( FOR

206.80
150.00

17. 50
150. 00

900.00

13-39

13. 39
1,750 00

2,229.81

1,569.11

I NFORMAT I ON

TAXABLE INCOME:
FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHELD:
STATE TAX WITHHELD FOR UTAH:

DEPOSIT

ONLY)

14,000.00

883.45

600.00

IE
WITHHOLDING STATUS:
XEMPTIONS:
INCOME TAX WITHHELD:

•R'AENEPIT

PLAN ( SBP)

MARRIED
05
17-50

STATE CODE:
STATE INCOME TAX WITHHELD:

COVERAGE

)P ELECTION IS REFLECTED ON YOUR ACCOUNT.

., gi.n.'.ai'rfS

UT

150.00

EXHIBIT C

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
HOME EQUITY CREDIT LINE
DISBURSEMENT REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION
PRINCIPAL

1*

50000.00

BORROWER:

LOAN DATE

07/29/95

LARRY V COX
JUDY M OOX
2202 E SBGO LILY
SANDY, UT

ACCOUNT NUMBER

APPLICATION ID

001101880000002886

105763

1

LENDER ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK

104TH SOUTH
1634 SOUTH JORDAN PARKWAY
SOUTH JORDAN, UT 84065

DR

84092

HOME EQUITY CREDIT LINE
DISBURSEMENT REQUEST AND AUTHORIZATION

LOAN TYPE. This is a Variable Rate, Open-End Line of Credit Loan with a Credit Limit of $ 5 0 0 0 0 . 0 0
PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LOAN. The primary purpose of this loan is for:
XX Personal, Family, or Household Purposes or Personal Investment
Business (Including Real Estate Investment)
SPECIFIC PURPOSE. The specific purpose of this loan is
DISBURSEMENT INSTRUCTIONS. I understand that no loan proceeds will be disbursed until any notice of righyto cancellation period
las expired and all of Zions First National Bank's conditions for making the loan have been satisfied Plea&e^&burse the loan proceeds
as follows:
Amount paid to me directly:
Amount paid on my accounts:

25,000.00

DEPOSITED TO #90-316845
$.
$.

Vmount paid to others for me:

CREDIT INSURANCE DISCLOSURE
r

OLUNTARY CREDIT INSURANCE. Credit Life Insurance and Credit Disability Insurance are not required to obtain credit and will not
e provided unless I sign and agree to pay the additional cost.

ty signing below- I acknowledge that I am not obtaining credit insurance for this loan for one of the following reasons, (a) I am not eligib
:>r credit insurance; (b) Credit insurance is not available from Zions Bank; or (c) If I am eligible and credit insurance is available from
Ions Bank J-'oo not want it.

07/29/95
DATE

LTD

07/29/9'
DATE

EXHIBIT D

HUD -1 UNIFORM SETTLEMENT STATEMEN I1

CEAiS i Sn 11 i in-

J.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

SETTLEMENT STATEMENT

T P E O F I OAN

6. File Number:

3. •X Conv, I kins,

7. Loan Number:
980205821
8. Mortgage Insurance Case Number

9903-172

2. FmHA
5. Conv, Ins.

I, Ft!A
4, VA

OTE: This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown. Items marked "(p.o.c.)"
id outside the closing; they arc shown here for informational purposes and are not included in the totals.
NOTE: TIN = Taxpayer's Identification Number
AME AND ADDRESS OF BORROWER:

E.

NAME, ADDRESS AND TIN OF SELLER:

F.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF LENDER:

C i t y Mo r i g a - ' j c

East Sego Lily Drive
', Utah 84092
OPERTY LOCATION:

H.

SETTLEMENT AGENT NAME, ADDRESS AND TIN

East Sego Lily Drive
, Utah 84092

Robe^ u
iut i. :
,,
4 6 2 5 S o u t h 230'.
i-L,
PLACE OF SETTLEMENT

Attorney
SLC, Utah

34ii7

I.

SETTLEMENT DATE

same a s above

J. SUMMARY OF BORROWER'S TRANSACTION
SS AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWER:
act sales price
lal property
nent charges to borrower (Line 1400)
5,483.59
98,824.20
k of America
51,250.17
i s Bank
tstments for items paid by seller in advance
wn taxes
'taxes
nents

i t a i n America C.U.
'S

L*>^-rS 4" a TTiM^f
-<?,<2.»<i- <h"
YveeJiJcL

*? u»^4l**— ^

\iu'S

W*'-.'

AMOUNT DUE FROM BORROWER

0^)1

-rV<3

r

ts

-

403.
404.
405.

—

Adjustments for items paid by seller in advance

IZZL

• i

|
Adjustments for items unpaid by seller

510. City/town taxes
511. County taxes
512. Assessments
513.
514.
«•

•

—

!

500. REDUCTIONS IN AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER:
501. Excess deposit
502. Settlement charges to seller (Line 1400)
503. Existing loan(s) taken subject to
504. Payoff of first mortgage loan
505. Payoff of second mortgage loan
506.
50T
508.
509.

taxes

yy

K. SUMMARY OF SELLER'S TRANSACTION
400. GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER:
401. Contract sales price
402. Personal property

icnts for items unpaid by seller
CCS

,j

406. City/town taxes
407. County taxes
408. Assessments
409.
10,514.00
410.
n re± <\_. <:_i*r£\<~ 411.
412.
420. GROSS AMOUNT DUE TO SELLER
166,071.96

NTS PAID BY OR IN BEHALF OF BORROWER:
or earnest money
1 amount of new loan(s)
168,500.00
loan(s) taken subject to
_ ^ r
350.00
)wer D e p o s i t
__

T

I

1
j
j

